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Abstract: 
Africa has not suffered a chronic failure of growth. African growth has been 
recurring. This paper reviews some growth spurts to substantiate that claim. The 
proximate cause of low income in Africa is that these spurts have always been 
followed by a bust. This is a significant reorientation of the central research 
question—away from a search for the root causes of African underdevelopment 
and towards explaining causes and effects of growth and decline. The growth 
spurts are approached as local responses to a global demand for African produced 
commodities. It is argued here that these supply responses involved more than a 
reallocation of land and labour; they entailed investment and required institutional 
change. It is precisely because these periods of rapid economic change and 
accumulation caused important qualitative changes in how the society and the 
economy were organized, that they cannot be ignored, as they have tended to be 
in the search for a root cause of Africa‘s chronic failure of growth. 
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African Growth Recurring: An Economic History Perspective on 
African Growth Episodes, 1690–2010
1
 
 
Despite manifest proof to the contrary the African post-colonial economic performance 
was summarized as: ‗it is clear that Africa has suffered a chronic failure of economic growth. 
The problem for analysis is to determine its causes‘.2 This stylized fact of permanent stagnation, 
which rings well with the popular view of the current income distribution of income and growth 
in the world, embodied in the phrase ‗the bottom billion‘,3 has provided the impetus for an 
economic growth literature that investigates the historical causes of persistence of low income in 
African economies.
4
 This search for the historical roots of poverty has created a renewed interest 
in African economic history,
5
 and economists, having agreed some time ago that ―institutions 
matter‖,6 are now seemingly forming a new consensus around another truism. This time it‘s 
―history matters‖.7 This paper certainly agrees with that point of departure, but suggests a 
different path: investigating economic growth in Africa as a process, rather than as one outcome 
with one historical root. 
The experience of growth among African economies might better be approached as 
‗growth recurring‘. The concept was used by Jones to describe that intensive growth or 
increasing per capita income did occur at several times and places both outside Europe and 
before the industrial revolution.
8
 His investigation was limited to the Eurasian Continent. 
According to Jones, economic history can be understood as an ongoing struggle between the 
                                                          
1 A shorter version of this paper was presented at the launch of Africa International Affairs Programme at the London School of 
Economics, IDEAS, March 2010. This paper would not have been written without continued critical reflections on the literature 
through panels and workshops organized on the ‗Historical Roots of Poverty‘ at the African Economic History Workshop 2009 at 
London School of Economics, at the European Conference for African Studies 2009 in Leipzig and finally at the World 
Economic History Congress 2009 in Utrecht. I am very grateful to the co-organizers of those panels, Gareth Austin and Alex 
Moradi and for all the contributions from the other participants. Alvaro Pereira provided valuable comments and references. Any 
mistakes are mine. 
2 Collier and Gunning, ‗Why has Africa grown slowly?’ for a critique see Jerven, ‗African Dummy‘. 
3 Also referred to as ‗Africa +‘ Collier, Bottom Billion. 
4 Acemoglu et al. ‗Reversal of Fortune‘, Acemoglu et al. ‗Colonial Origins‘, Nunn ‗Africa‘s slave trades‘ and Nunn ‗Historical 
Legacies‘, for a critique see Jerven ‗Relativity of Poverty‘ and Austin ‗Compression of History‘.  
5 Hopkins, ‗The New Economic History of Africa‘. 
6 For instance Bardhan, ‗Institutions Matter‘. 
7 Nunn, ‗Importance of History‘, Woolcock et al. ‗Why does History Matter?‘, Guinnane et al. ‗History matters‘. 
8 Jones, Growth Recurring. 
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propensity for growth and the propensity for rent-seeking. When the propensity for growth is 
stronger it results in a period of increased per capita incomes. Such episodes have occurred 
throughout the world, and although most of these periods were not ‗growth triumphant‘,9 as in 
the case of European industrialisation or that of late developers in other regions such as East-
Asia, they were still important in that they were associated with qualitative changes in how 
polities were organized and led to significant increases in some kind of economic welfare.  
Africa has experienced such growth episodes. This paper will investigate periods of per 
capita income increases in Africa in pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial times taking as a 
starting point the concept of recurring growth. These growth episodes were rooted in trade and 
the world economy, but growth was only possible due to a reorganization of factors of 
production, a combination of investment and technological growth which had significant 
consequences for political economy. The central thesis in this article is that while factors of 
production could be relocated relatively smoothly and producers were able to change patterns of 
specialization with temporary social costs, the patterns of boom and bust crucially affected state 
revenue, and thus necessitated reorientation of the state, a process that often was often slow, 
costly and associated with conflict.  
This paper will make use of some existing scholarly work quantifying such growth 
episodes through history from the pre-colonial times until today, and evaluate the development 
outcome of these episodes. It will then reconsider and compare the two post-colonial growth 
episodes: 1950–1975 and 1995–2009. The IMF now predicts a fall in GDP per capita for African 
economies in 2010, marking the end of a period of sustained growth since the mid 1990s. This is 
a good point at which to consider the development effects of this recent period of economic 
growth. Whether the current global economic slowdown will evolve into a prolonged crisis like 
that of 1975 to 1995 is too early to tell. This paper offers some tools to analyse these prospects, 
not currently offered in the African growth literature.  
                                                          
9 Easterlin, Growth Triumphant. 
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I 
I.1 Root Causes of African Underdevelopment 
If one accepts the stylized fact of persistent growth failure in post-colonial Africa and 
approaches economic growth as a linear concept, the next logical step is, and indeed has been, a 
search for the root cause of underdevelopment.
10
 Low income today must be the result of lack of 
growth in the past. The ‗first generation‘ of empirical growth literature explained the lack of 
growth in post-colonial Africa by linking measures of low institutional quality and proxies for 
growth retarding policies with slow average growth.
11
 Lack of openness to trade, state 
intervention in markets and rent-seeking activities, and other variables were found to correlate 
with and were argued to be causally related to slow growth in Africa.
12
 In 1981, Bates offered a 
seminal rational choice theory explanation to why these growth retarding policies were adopted 
in the first place, arguing that African politicians chose policies that served their own interests 
rather than those favouring economic development.
13
 The ‗second generation‘ of growth 
literature ventured further down this path suggesting that lack of growth and lack of pro-growth 
policies could be explained by ‗initial conditions‘, using different measures for lack of state 
legitimacy, lack of social capital and ethnic diversity to explain why African states are incapable 
of development.
14
  
A noted complaint from economic historians to economists‘ work on African 
development was that 1960 was conventionally taken as a starting point, as if the period before 
this point, and therefore African economic history, had no relevance for economic policy today.
15
 
There has been a definite change of emphasis in the recent years. The seminal contribution here 
was made by Acemoglu et al., who argued that different patterns of colonization have had a 
persistent impact on economic growth through institutions.
16
 Austin recently suggested that the 
                                                          
10 For a critique of this logic and a review of different growth patterns, see Pritchett, ‗Patterns of economic growth‘. 
11 Collier and Gunning, ‗Explaining African Economic Growth‘, Jerven, ‗African Dummy‘. 
12 Barro and Lee ‗Losers and winners‘, Mauro, ‗Corruption‘, Sachs and Warner ‗Sources of Slow Growth‘. Durlauf et al. 
‗Growth Econometrics‘, p 639 report that in cross-country growth regressions, 145 explanatory variables have been found 
statistically significant, and identifies 43 conceptually different ‗theories‘ of growth as being ‗proven‘ in the literature. 
13 Bates, States and Markets. For a critique see Leys, Rise and Fall of Development Theory. 
14 Englebert, ‗Post-Colonial States‘, Temple, ‗Social Capital‘ and Easterly and Levine ‗African Growth Tragedy‘. 
15 Hopkins, ‗World Bank‘, Manning, ‗The Long run‘ and Austin, ‗Eurocentric‘. 
16 Acemoglu et al ‗Reversal of Fortune‘. 
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‗reversal of fortune‘ thesis is the most discussed contribution of development economists since 
Lewis‘s model of unlimited supply of labour,17 while Hopkins declared this recent surge in 
contributions to the study of long run growth in Africa the ‗new economic history of Africa‘.18  
The main contenders in the empirical growth literature searching for a root cause of 
underdevelopment can be organized in three chronological strands: according to whether they 
emphasise the negative effect of initial conditions particular to Africa‘s geographical 
characteristics; or the decisive impact of the slave trade or finally with the effects of the 
European colonization.
19
 Many of the contributions are variations of the same argument, 
essentially arguing that a particular historical event or factor endowment led to a particular 
institutional constellation that has had lasting economic effect. The big question in the literature 
is that of which of these historical events had the decisive impact and secondly, through which 
transmission channels it continues to have an effect. A divisive issue is the relative importance of 
institutions versus geography, or as it was succinctly phrased in debate: ‗Institutions rule‘ versus 
‗Institutions don‘t rule‘.20 The common feature of the literature is that it searches for a root cause 
of African underdevelopment, to explain a static outcome of growth failure. It is argued here that 
there might be more to learn from investigating economic change and that those lessons call the 
assumption of path dependence of institutions into question.  
I.2 The Political Economy of Episodic Growth in Africa 
Specialization towards exports for production is at the heart of the growth episodes to be 
reviewed subsequently. It is a truism that specialization increases risk, a risk that may or may not 
be justified by increased returns. Thus, in conventional development economics this is an issue 
of opportunity costs. That risks are higher in production for a market than in ‗subsistence 
production‘ is not straightforward. A rational choice perspective would interpret the manifest 
growth in production for the market as implying that the informal cost-benefit analysis worked 
                                                          
17 Austin ‗Compression of History‘. 
18 Hopkins ‗The New Economic History of Africa‘. 
19 As summarized by Battacharyya ‗Root Causes of African Underdevelopment‘. The seminal contributions for each respective 
strand is Sachs and Bloom ‗Geography, Demography, and Economic Growth in Africa‘, Nunn ‗Africa‘s Slave Trade‘ and 
Acemoglu et al ‗Reversal of Fortune‘ and ‗Colonial Origins‘. 
20 Rodrik et al. ‗Institutions Rule‘ and Sachs ‗Institutions Don‘t Rule‘. 
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out in favour of specialization. A political economy perspective would take into account the fact 
that specialization was not an individual decision, but often subject to force in the interplay 
between individuals and pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial states. African producers have 
been able to balance these risks, and sometimes at the expense of the state. States and their rulers 
have sought to specialize in taxation of production for the market or used its monopoly on certain 
resources. When the markets for these products have failed, so have the states.  
The factor endowment perspective, as endorsed by Sokoloff and Engerman for Latin 
America, and modified for Africa by Austin, accounting for seasonal and historical changes in 
these factor allocations, argues that institutions form in response to factor endowments.
21
 A 
related formulation is the staple theory, used by Hopkins to analyze the implications of different 
export bases, in particular those arising from differences in factor combinations and the returns 
to scale.
22
 The perspective adopted here argues more specifically that the revenue base of the 
state has been changing dramatically through these recurring periods of growth, and importantly 
that the character of the state has determined how and whether these revenues were re-invested. 
Periods of rapid economic change were accompanied by institutional change. It is these 
dynamics that call the wisdom of a root cause into question.  
Cooper, a historian, suggested the characterization of the African state as a ‗gatekeeper 
state‘, describing the colonial and post-colonial state in Africa as typically relying on taxing 
exports.
23
 Bayart, a political scientist, places the origin of this external dependence further back 
in time and argues that the slave trade was the first move towards ‗extraversion‘.24 The 
dependency theory statement of this argument puts agency firmly with Europe in this 
transformation,
25
 in Bayart‘s version the African elites played the key role. Bayart focuses on the 
orientation of the domestic political elite; a similar logic is found in natural resource curse 
theory, where it is argued that the political elite have no incentive to promote favourable 
institutions when rents are secured through mineral rents.
26
 Going beyond mineral revenues, 
Deaton‘s landmark study of commodity exports prices and African economic growth found no 
                                                          
21Sokoloff and Engerman, ‗Factor Endowments‘, ‗ Austin, ‗Resources, techniques, and strategies‘. 
22 Hopkins, West Africa, p. 125. 
23 Cooper, Africa since 1940. 
24 Bayart, ‗Africa in the world‘. 
25 Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa? 
26 Auty, Resource Abundance. 
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clear support for the resource curse thesis. He found that African economies do better when the 
prices of commodities are high and that they suffer when prices are low.
27
 Thus the ‗paradox of 
plenty‘ does not apply in Deaton‘s view. There are opportunities rather than curses deriving from 
commodity export and related economic growth.  
As will be illustrated in a study of growth episodes in the second section of this paper, 
these approaches all underestimate the institutional changes and in particular the changes in the 
role of agency in the process of specialization. To be specific: the specialization in slave trade 
testifies to the power of African elites and states, and from their perspective it was a means of 
securing returns through exports in lieu of a land tax. After the closing of the trans-Atlantic slave 
market growth in ‗legitimate commerce‘ did in some places occur in spite of both of pre-colonial 
and colonial states. Thus peasants were the leading agent of change in this period. The marketing 
boards, an institutional innovation by the colonial state, provided the basis for the state to 
reassert itself, and built the foundation for the post-colonial state. When these revenues were 
undermined by external markets and internal rent-seeking, structural adjustment and a 
radicalization of ‗extraversion‘ occurred. The most recent growth episodes have been based 
predominantly on mineral exports. The internal revenue base of the state has remained limited 
and taxation through marketing boards has been curtailed.  
II 
This section examines the picture of African growth according to the available aggregate 
data sources. Data on African economic growth is not only constrained by low quality, but also 
by low availability.
28
 The main reason that studies of economic growth have been confined to the 
period after 1960 is that datasets are not generally available for earlier periods. Thus when Artadi 
and Sala-i-Martin addresses the ‗the economic tragedy of the XXth Century‘ the data marshalled 
to substantiate the claim is covers only 1960 to 2002.
29
 There are data that go further back in 
time than that. Some colonial statistical offices did produce national account estimates, and as 
will be reviewed here, official estimates were made for Rhodesia and Nyasaland from 1945 
                                                          
27 Deaton, ‗Commodity Prices and Growth‘. 38. 
28 Jerven, ‗Random Growth‘. 
29 Artadi and Sala-i-Martin, ‗The economic tragedy of the XXth Century‘. 
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onwards. In addition some individuals have provided estimates for parts of the colonial period.
30
 
The dataset currently providing the longest time series is made available by Maddison.
31
  
Table 1: African and World GDP per Capita, 1 (C.E.) – 1950 
  1 1000 1500 1600 1700 1820 1870 1900 1913 1940 1950 
Total Africa  472 425 414 422 421 420 500 601 637 813 889 
World 467 453 566 596 615 667 871 1,262 1,525 1,958 2,109 
Source: Maddison (2009). All values in constant 1990 International Geary-Khamis dollars. Note that the only 
African countries for which Maddison has individual income estimates for in this period are Algeria, Egypt, Libya, 
Tunisia and Morocco.  
 
Austin recommends caution when approaching these observations and reminds us that the 
literal interpretation of the word data is ‗things that are given‘ and that therefore many of the 
historical income or population estimates used in the literature for African economies should not 
be considered as data in the strictest sense.
32
 The underlying primary sources are not always 
available for Maddison, but presumably the data before 1960 are projections relying on proxy 
variables such as exports and taxation (annually published national income estimates were 
generally not published before 1960s).
33
 While there is only available annual international 
comparable GDP per capita ‗data‘ for all African countries between 1950 and 2006, there are 
observations for the whole continent back to year 1. 
The GDP per capita estimates in Table 1 assume that on average ‗Africa‘ was richer than 
other parts of the world in year 1. This is driven by an estimated higher income in Egypt than 
elsewhere in the world. The data implies that ‗Africa‘ gradually fell behind the rest of the world 
due to stagnation in income per capita from year 1000 to 1820. Between 1820 and 1913 income 
per capita increased in ‗Africa‘, but was falling further behind the world on average as incomes 
increased more rapidly in other places. Between 1913 and 1950 Africa ceased falling behind the 
world average, according to the data. In this period the average GDP per capita growth was 1 
                                                          
30 For example by Szereszewski Economy of Ghana, Deane, Colonial Accounting, Okigbo, Nigeria National Accounts and 
Bigsten, ‗Economic Growth in Kenya‘. 
31 Maddison, ‗Historical Statistics of the World Economy‘. 
32 Austin, ‗Compression of History‘ p. 1002. 
33 For a review of early national accounting in Africa see Ady, ‗National Accounts in Africa‘. 
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percent. Population growth (using data from the same dataset) is estimated at 1 percent, meaning 
that the economies in Africa were growing at an average 2 percent in this period. 
The general aggregate picture shown in Table 1 does not reflect what is known 
concerning periods of export growth, state formation and accumulation in parts of Africa. There 
were large flows both of factors of production and commodities, both internally and externally, 
during the Atlantic Slave trade and the crash-crop revolution. Kingdoms rose and fell; colonial 
empires were established, railways and mines developed and yet the GDP per capita measure 
barely blinks. Indeed, Bloom and Sachs uses an earlier version of the Maddison data to conclude 
that for the past two centuries, ―Africa‘s poor economic growth has been chronic rather than 
episodic.‖34 It will be argued here that it is certain that well documented growth in African 
markets for currency, labour and goods led to Smithian growth through specialization in some 
areas.
35
 Moreover, the Atlantic trade brought with it not only exchange of commodities, but also 
new technology for instance, th which must have led to 
increased total factor productivity.
36
 In addition, the economic growth could not have occurred 
without significant investments in land improvement, planting of perennial crops and transport 
infrastructure. Finally, there is these growth episodes induced historically documented 
institutional changes such as a formation of markets in land and labour, the strengthening of 
states as well as increased living standards.  
This paper re-evaluates the long history of economic fluctuations for African economies, 
and juxtaposes the static aggregate data story with data on four cases of boom and bust. The first 
is set in pre-colonial and colonial Dahomey and considers the development effects of export 
booms in slaves and palm oil. The second case is grounded in a quantitative investigation of the 
cocoa boom in the Gold Coast. In the third case study the copper boom in Northern Rhodesia is 
examined.
37
 The fourth and final case is about the diamond based growth in post-colonial 
Botswana. The last section of the paper considers recurring growth in Africa and evaluates the 
                                                          
34 Bloom and Sachs, ‗Geography, Demography and Economic Growth in Africa‘, p. 2. 
35 Hopkins, West Africa. 
36 G. Austin, ‗Resources, techniques, and strategies‘ p. 588. 
37 Contemporary Benin, Ghana and Zambia respectively. 
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growth experience in 1995–2009 in comparison with the economic growth in the period from 
1950 to 1975.  
II.1  Case 1: Slave Trade and Export Growth in Pre-Colonial and Colonial 
Dahomey 
The experience of Dahomey, 1690–1950, could be considered typical for West and 
Central African coastal states, of which many at this time were deeply integrated in the Atlantic 
economy. According to Manning, two million slaves were exported from the West African 
region through the Kingdom of Dahomey between 1640 and 1865.
38
 Like Asante and Oyo, 
Dahomey grew from a small state to a major kingdom in this period.
39
 This pattern was not 
replicated throughout. Some states chose to disengage from the slave trade, like Benin and 
Kongo, and in other areas low political concentration prevailed.
40
 The slave trade had millions of 
African victims, but it is generally agreed upon that African agents, be it states or networks of 
merchants, engaged in this trade because they were able to realize sizable economic gains from 
these economic transactions.
41
 Europeans traders generally did not have the means to coerce 
African leaders to sell slaves.
42
 This topic is extensively debated and studied, and many scholars 
have argued that the slave trade had lasting negative economic effects. The direct effect of lost 
manpower and the persistence of low labour concentrations in Sub-Saharan Africa figure 
prominently. Inikori argues that ―the transformation of the Gold Coast into a major exporter of 
captives to the Americas retarded the developing inter-regional specialization and the growing 
commercialization of agriculture.‖43 It has further been suggested that the persistence of poverty 
in Africa was caused by the slave trade either through negative effects on state formation, or 
social capital such as trust.
44
 The latter work tends to understate the economic motivations for 
                                                          
38 Manning, Slavery, Colonialism and Economic Growth. 
39 Austin, ‗Compression of History‘ p. 1005. 
40 Klein, ‗Decentralized Societies‘. 
41 Northrup, Africa’s Discovery, p. 56. 
42 Thornton, Making of the Atlantic World. 
43 Inikori, ‗Africa and globalization‘. 
44 Nunn, ‗Africa‘s slave trades‘. 
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states engaging in the slave trade, and has not explicitly dealt with the implications of short term 
gain versus long term effects.
45
  
Table 2: Income and Growth, Benin 1800 – 1950 
 
Real National Income Growth 
 
Per Capita Domestic Product 
(1913, GB pounds) 
1800s–1840s 1.1 1.5 
1840s–1860s 3.4 1.9 
1860s–1890s 2.7 3.4 
1890s–1910s 1.7 5.8 
1910s–1930s 2.8 6.7 
1930s–1950s 0.1 9.5 
 
Source: Manning (1982). The data for national income growth are proxied by import purchasing power, and the per 
capita income is estimated by assuming that the per capita export revenue multiplied by seven equals per capita 
domestic product. We should not accept these data as ‗facts‘, but they are an indication of the rate of change, and of 
the economic resources at the state‘s disposal. By comparison, according to the Governor of Southern Rhodesia, the 
per capita purchasing power in Jamaica and Zimbabwe in 1933 was 30 and 70 shillings respectively.
46
 
 
 
The data span from the end of the slave trade and into the period of ‗legitimate 
commerce‘. A central thesis, suggested by Hopkins, is that the closing of the Atlantic slave trade 
market meant stagnation and loss of power for centralized states as fiscal capacity disappeared; 
this is referred to as the ‗crisis of adaptation‘.47 It did not always mean the end of slavery as a 
mode of production, as documented by Lovejoy and Hogendorn: ―At the time of the colonial 
conquest (1897–1903), the Sokoto Caliphate had a huge slave population, certainly in excess of 1 
million and perhaps more than 2.5 million people‖.48 Furthermore, in some areas such as 
Dahomey, the ban of the slave trade actually led to an intensification of trade in slaves in the 
middle of the 19th century.
49
 
                                                          
45 Austin, ‗Resources, techniques, and strategies‘. 
46 Bowden et al. ‗Measuring and Explaining Poverty‘, p. 1054. 
47 Hopkins, An economic history of West Africa, ch.4. 
48 Lovejoy and Hogendorn, Slow death for slavery, p. 1. 
49 Flint and McDougall, ‗West Africa‘. 
  African Growth Recurring     15 
 
Manning‘s estimates reproduced in Table 2 provide a suggestive quantitative study of 
effects of the slave trade in Dahomey. It is estimated that during the height of the slave trade the 
per capita export revenue in Dahomey was comparable to that of Great Britain.
50
 This probably 
led to a rapid increase of GDP per capita, while total GDP might have declined because of the 
loss of manpower. In the longer run this kind of economic growth was not sustainable.
51
 The 
economic specialization in slave trading suggests that, from the point of view of the states, the 
return on slave exports was superior to the return on labour that could be captured in other 
domestic production.
52
 The profitable slave business thus facilitated the growth of stronger 
states. Imports of money and other commodities further spurred exchange and growth in the 
domestic economy for some actors. When the slave trade ended in the 19th century, this 
undermined the fiscal basis of Dahomey as well as other West African states.
53
 
The end of the slave trade opened up new economic opportunities. It paved the way for 
what has been called the period of ‗legitimate commerce‘ and what is also referred to as the 
‗cash-crop revolution‘ in Sub-Saharan Africa.54 This was largely a peasant response, though 
some crops were produced at plantations. Some of these were worked by slaves like the ones 
involved in palm production in the Sokoto Caliphate as referred to above. The cocoa boom was a 
different matter and involved African peasants, or capitalists as Hill calls them.
55
 The growth in 
Dahomey recorded in Table 2 was underpinned by palm oil and palm kernel exports. The growth 
rates are proxies and should not be interpreted literally, but testify to a rapid export growth that 
further facilitated growth in the domestic economy. Less is known regarding the effect and the 
relative importance of the local economy.
56
 Helleiner, in his study of the Nigerian economy, 
reasoned that the export economy only accounted for 15 percent of the total economy in 1900.
57
 
For 19th century West Africa, Flint and McDougall suggested that as much as 90 percent of all 
production remained outside the cash based coastal economies.
58
 If we take Manning‘s data 
seriously it would mean a tripling in GDP per capita during a half a century of export based 
                                                          
50 Manning, Slavery, Colonialism and Economic Growth p 3. 
51 Manning, Slavery, Colonialism and Economic Growth p 4. 
52 Manning, Slavery, Colonialism and Economic Growth p 12. 
53 Austin, ‗Compression of History‘ p. 1005. 
54 Law, ‘Legitimate’ Commerce. 
55 Hill, Rural Capitalism. 
56 Cooper, ‗Africa and the World Economy‘ p. 91-92.  
57 Helleiner, Peasant Agriculture, p. 7. 
58 Flint and McDougall, ‗West Africa‘, p. 398. 
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growth. According to Manning, the French colonial rulers taxed the exports but the impact of the 
colonial authorities on economic organization was modest.
59
 There was some fiscal drain of the 
export revenues (estimated at 3 percent of domestic product) but it was the Depression and the 
Second World War that finally undermined economic growth, and Benin has yet to experience 
sustained growth again apart from a very short period in the 1980s.  
The example of growth from pre-colonial and colonial Dahomey, with export booms first 
in slaves and second in palm oil and kernels, shows that the external market can function as a 
‗vent for surplus‘.60 However, it was not simply a reallocation of previously idle resources, 
labour and land.
61
 The case further shows that reliance on external export markets cannot be 
sustained indefinitely. The end of the slave trade led to a crisis for African states, but created an 
opportunity for African peasants. How that opportunity was seized and how it contributed to 
growth and development is best examined in the case of cocoa in Ghana. 
II.2  Case 2: Cocoa Production and Export Growth in Colonial Ghana 
The cocoa boom originated in the colony of Gold Coast, but spread to other areas, for 
instance Ivory Coast and Nigeria, where peasants responded to the earning potential arising from 
an external market demand for this new cash crop. In his study of the Ghanian economy from the 
end of the slave trade until independence Austin writes that ―much of the rise in rural output 
should be attributed to higher productivity‖ and that the expansion of production also no doubt 
―involved a vast increase in the quantities of resources employed within the rural economy‖.62 
This increase in production of cocoa was only made possible by a vast increase ―in the stock of 
capital in the form of cocoa trees‖.63 So in pre-colonial (Asante) and colonial (Gold Coast) 
Ghana there was both intensive and extensive growth, based first on the export and production of 
kola nuts, gold, timber and rubber (‗legitimate commerce‘) and then from the very end of the 19th 
century and based on cocoa production (the ‗cash-crop revolution‘). 
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61 Smith ‗Long-run Structural Change in Nigeria‘ and Tosh ‗The cash-crop revolution‘. 
62 Austin, Labour, Land and Capital in Ghana, p. 432. 
63 Ibid. 
  African Growth Recurring     17 
 
Table 3: Gold Coast GDP, 1911 constant prices (GB pounds) 
          1891 1901 1911 
        
Export Production    872 740 3,612 
Private Consumption of Imported Goods  1,595 2,741 4,310 
Consumption of Government and Public Services 150 490 635 
Gross Capital Formation       
     a) buildings and construction   98 837 800 
     b) equipment     56 287 490 
     c) cocoa     4 169 1,573 
     d) net accumulation of species   73 257 560 
     e) changes in stocks of imported goods  8 17 -3 
Traditional Consumption   9,200 10,000 11,100 
Imports of Goods and Non-Factor Services    
     a) imports of merchandise and non-factor services -835 -1,870 -3,050 
     b) net imports of specie     -73 -257 -560 
        
Total (A): including Traditional consumption 11,148 13,411 19,467 
Total (B): excluding Traditional consumption 1,948 3,411 8,367 
        
Per capita in GB pounds, Total A    6.8 7.5 9.7 
Per capital in GB pounds, Total B    1.2 1.9 4.2 
 
Source: Szereszewski (1965) 
 
Szereszewski‘s estimates indicate a period of rapid growth. If the assumed stagnation in 
traditional consumption is not taken into account, GDP per capita more than tripled over two 
decades, implying a very high growth in the export economy and implying a 6.5 percent per 
capita growth over the period.  
This rapid expansion did facilitate the improvement in living standards and diets. Moradi 
et al. has associated this growth with marked increases in the mean height of the Ghanaian 
population born in this period, indicating that the cash crop growth did result in widespread 
development in Ghana during the colonial period.
64
 This cocoa boom and the economic growth 
in the countries dependent on this crop eventually petered out. In Ghana the end of growth came 
prematurely due to perverse taxation of the cocoa peasants in Ghana during the 1960s (some of it 
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indirect by allowing the Ghanaian Cedi become grossly overvalued). Growth continued in 
neighbouring Ivory Coast until the late 1970s when depressed world market prices led to 
stagnation and decline in cocoa earnings also there. As pointed out by Hopkins, Ivory Coast did 
have a slow start due to French colonial discriminatory agricultural policies, and did in part grow 
so quickly because the state suddenly became favourably disposed to cocoa production following 
independence.
65
 
The lesson from this particular period is that growth was rapid and sustained over a long 
period. Although production was largely taking place in spite of, not because of, the state, it 
enabled the colonial and the post-colonial state to expand its expenditures. While the increase in 
financial and other resources caused widespread development according to most indicators we 
have access to, it also spurred positive institutional change, such as development of markets in 
capital, land and credit. In Ghana, it would be fair to say that growth was cut short by a rent-
seeking propensity of the post-colonial state, but it should also be remembered that the limits of 
the external market in the end caught up with Ivory Coast in the late 1970s, bringing the collapse 
of its post-independence growth.  
II.3  Case 3: Copper Boom and Mining Growth in Colonial and Post Colonial 
Zambia 
Copper has been produced for at least a millennium in what was Northern Rhodesia, but 
until the late 1920s the country‘s development was described as ―fitful and speculative‖.66 The 
British South African Company, controlling the territory since 1890, was not originally 
optimistic about copper mining, mainly because of concerns of the high transport costs. In the 
1920s Northern Rhodesia became a British colony and the prospects for growth changed. Growth 
in the electricity and automobile industries radically altered the demand and consequently the 
price for copper in the world market, thus the high transport costs could be overcome. The 
Northern Rhodesian copper industry consisted of two major mining groups: Rhodesian Anglo 
American (RAA) and Rhodesian Selection Trust (RST), the former controlled mainly by South 
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African and the latter by North American capital. Large scale copper production in Northern 
Rhodesia coincided with the onset of the Depression and the prices for copper, which earlier had 
been upheld by a producers‘ cartel, fell sharply from 1929. Production re-started in the 1930s as 
demand for copper in the world market revived.
67
  
According to Roberts, the copper mines of Northern Rhodesia ―represent a particularly 
striking example of the ‗leakage‘ of wealth from an African colony‖.68After the Second World 
War Southern Rhodesian politicians lobbied to unite Southern and Northern Rhodesia with 
Nyasaland in a single Central African State, appealing particularly to the large copper companies 
and arguing that economics of scale effects would benefit the industry, in particular in energy 
provision.
69
 The Federation was formed in 1953 and according to Hall ―the Copper belt was the 
milk cow and Northern Rhodesia suffered a net loss in the years 1953–64 of nearly £ 100 million 
– the bulk of which was used to develop Southern Rhodesia and the rest to prop up 
Nyasaland.‖70 Production, sales and investment in the copper industry increased rapidly in the 
post WW2 period, benefiting from high prices and a devaluation of the pound. But as Murray, a 
former commissioner for Zambia, noted, the federation diverted ‗money which we could well 
have invested within our own borders‘.71 Supporting this point, a commission reporting for the 
colonial office in 1938 noted that ―social services are very backward‖, but that this ―would not 
be the case if it received a larger proportion of the proceeds of the country's only really important 
industry, the mining industry.‖72 
Certainly, political independence in Zambia ―soon led to a marked reduction in the 
leakage of copper profits abroad‖, but the process of controlling the revenue was not 
straightforward.
73
 The first step was the introduction of an export tax in 1966, instead of the 
previous royalty system. In 1969 the government took a 51 percent ownership in the mines. In 
return for equity the companies were given dollar denominated bonds with 8 to 12 year 
maturities. In 1973 the second and decisive move was taken, when the Zambian government 
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borrowed from international lenders and redeemed the bonds.
74
 These moves were not resisted 
by the foreign mining companies. ―According to H. F. Oppenheimer, one of the great South 
African mining magnates, the new arrangements provided the companies with liquid funds 
derived from compensation payments that enabled the corporations to broaden their field of 
operations elsewhere.‖75  
The economist Harvey wrote in 1970: ―For the future one can only look to the planned 
increases in copper production, the promising trend in imports, the large reserves, and keep one‘s 
fingers crossed, as ever, concerning the copper price.‖76 In retrospect the timing of the Zambian 
government was very poor; ―by 1974 copper (the source of some 98 percent of all Zambia‘s 
export earnings) had drastically decreased in value; inflation had caused costs to spiral, and the 
two great state owned mining concerns were operating at a loss.‖77 At the time Shaw noted that 
the ability of the ruling class to maintain political order in Zambia was related to the production 
and price of copper, and argued that Zambia was one of the ―most dependent economies when 
measured along the contribution of a single dominant industry.‖78 
The data on copper production in Figure 1 tells a story of rapid growth from the 1930s 
into the 1970s, followed by a long period of decline. Deaton in his study of commodity prices 
shows that copper prices remained low through the 1970s and 1980s, with an improvement in the 
1990s when production also starts recovering.
79
 The Central African Statistical Office in 
Southern Rhodesia published national account statistics in the Monthly Digest of Statistics from 
1945 onwards. It gives further support to what the copper statistics already indicate. In current 
prices, the value of domestic production increased more than 9 times, averaging an annual 
growth of 29 percent. Expressed in constant prices, using a pound deflator, this represents faster 
growth than the average of 20 percent GDP growth in the decade from 1945 to 1955—far faster 
than the ‗growth miracle‘ recorded in post-colonial Botswana.80 
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Figure 1: Copper Production in Northern Rhodesia (tonnes), 1920–2006 
 
 
Sources: 1920-1938, Blue Book (Rhodesia), 1941–1945, Economic Statistical Bulletin (1952) and 1946–2008, 
International Copper Study Group (Supplied data on request).  
 
 
Table 4: National Income at Factor Cost, Northern Rhodesia 1945–1962, £Million 
  1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 
 Gross Domestic Economy 15.4 18.1 27.8 34 43.9 58.5 85.9 96.8 112.2 
 
 
 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 
 Gross Domestic Economy 150.5 177.4 195.6 161.2 144.7 201.6 218.5 200.9 198.2 
Source: Central Statistical Office, Monthly Digest of Statistics (1951, 1962 and 1964) 
 
In Zambia, economic growth accelerated and decelerated in accordance with external 
market opportunities. Because of the colonial political economy, during the mining boom the 
mineral rents were only in part invested in the Zambian economy. In the decade after 
independence, while world market prices were high and rents from the mines available, domestic 
investments were made in industrial diversification, infrastructure and human capital. Most of 
these investments had to be reversed in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s when the copper market was 
depressed.
81
 The prolonged crisis led to severe indebtedness, predatory rent-seeking and 
considerable political unrest, but never outright violent contest for the state.  
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II.4  Case 4: Diamond-Led Growth in Botswana, 1973–2009 
Botswana has received considerable attention because of its rapid economic growth in the 
post-colonial period. Its growth rate has by some measures surpassed that of any country in the 
world since the 1960s.
82
 The country has figured widely as the exceptional African growth 
success story, in marked contrast to the ―African growth tragedy‖.83 In the literature on African 
growth Botswana is frequently cited as the ‗exception that proves the rule‘ by scholars who 
argue that African economies are capable of rapid economic growth as long as the institutional 
framework and development policies are right. Botswana has confirmed that African economies 
can perform well, despite the potential of being caught in various ‗development traps‘, such as 
the natural resource trap‘ or its landlocked position. Botswana‘s citizens have decisively escaped 
membership in what Collier calls the ‗bottom billion‘ thanks to a few decades of rapid growth 
―when it achieved the world fastest growth rate‖.84 In the growth literature, ‗there is almost 
complete consensus that Botswana achieved rapid growth because it managed to adopt good 
policies‘.85  
The De Beers Botswana Mining Company (Debswana) was established in 1969 in order 
to develop the Orapa diamond mine, the second largest kimberlitic pipe in the world at the 
time.86 In 1975 a second pipe was discovered at Orapa in 1975. According to Jefferis, De Beers 
recovered its original investment in Orapa within less than two years. In 1977 the largest 
diamond discovery came at Jwaneng and development of the mining complex cost over USD250 
million, including the infrastructure of the new town. Production commenced in 1982 (Jefferis 
1987: 301).
87
 The original 1970 agreement between Debswana and the government provided a 
royalty based on production levels, taxation on profits and a free 15 percent equity share for the 
government. ―Full details of the new agreement have never been disclosed, but it is reputed to be 
one of the best mineral exploitation contracts in the world‖ from the perspective of Botswana.88 
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De Beers runs the Central Selling Organisation (CSO) marketing cartel, which controls 
about 80 percent of the world‘s supply of rough diamonds. This means that as a commodity, the 
price level of diamonds is relatively stable, and the selling price is much higher than the 
production cost due to monopoly profits. The CSO has been able to control supply through a 
buffer stock arrangement that has been judged to be ―by far the world‘s most successful 
commodity buffer stock arrangement.‖89 The CSO represents a durable producer cartel, exactly 
what primary producers have strived to achieve but never succeeded in establishing on a 
permanent basis.  
Figure 2: Botswana, Diamond Production (000 carats), 1973–2009 
 
Sources: 1973-1998, Botswana, Statistical Bulletin (1982, 1985, 1993, 1999), 1998–2003, Botswana, Statistical 
Yearbook (2003) and 2004–2009 (Debswana Online Data). Data for 2007 missing. 
 
By the mid 1990s Botswana had become the largest diamond producer in the world, 
giving it a significant power when bargaining royalty contracts.
90
 In tune with diamond output, 
growth has stagnated in Botswana since the mid 1990s. As a response to failing demand 
connected with the global economic slowdown, the diamond mines shut down operations in 
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summer 2009.
91
 As is shown in Figure 2, output in 2009 will be half of that in 2008 as a result of 
the midyear shut-down.  
While Botswana is well known as the ‗African growth miracle‘, the previous three cases 
show that rapid growth over a period of two or three decades is not as exceptional in an African 
context as commonly assumed. The current events in Botswana‘s diamond industry are raising 
the possibility of retrogression also in Botswana. It has been pointed out that one of sources of 
political stability and democracy in the country is the availability of mineral rents.
92
 These rents 
have been invested in infrastructure and human capital, but the economy remains undiversified 
and heavily dependent on import; thus its future growth depends on the demand for diamonds. 
Some scholars have further questioned the Botswana development miracle, pointing to the 
increased inequalities in income and the limited gains made apart from accrued diamond 
earnings.
93
  
Booms and busts in African economic history both leave lasting effects. Growth in the 
pre-colonial period, based on the slave trade, was definitely unsustainable in the long term—but 
the rents from this growth were captured by elites and in some cases it facilitated the temporary 
strengthening of states and their fiscal capacity. Conversely, although the end of the Atlantic 
slave trade in the 19th century weakened those states dependent on the trade, it induced another 
period of growth based on agricultural production.  
The growth of export crop production in the 19th century did entail large improvements 
in GDP per capita which were enjoyed by the peasant population, sometimes directly. The 
opportunity to capture rents from this growth in exports was eventually seized by the colonial 
state through the formation of marketing boards. These revenues facilitated the emergence of the 
developmental state in the late colonial period and until structural adjustment. In many cases 
states engaged in predatory rent-seeking, letting producer prices drop to small fraction of world 
market prices. Inflation and overvalued currencies contributed strongly to this trend. In some 
states, elites did not favour heavy taxation of export crops. Nevertheless, both regimes favouring 
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crop production and those biased against it failed, and both types underwent structural 
adjustment in the 1980s.  
The mining booms in Botswana and Zambia testify to the power of external markets to 
spur rapid increases in GDP per capita, which lead to qualitative changes in these economies as 
well. Both countries experienced urbanization and increase in formal employment. The 
vulnerability associated with mining dependence is well illustrated by the case of Zambia. The 
infrastructural investment and human capital investments ceased, and the initial improvements 
eventually reversed in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s when copper prices remained low, and 
external dependence only increased with its external debts. During colonial rule the Northern 
Rhodesian state received very limited share of the copper revenues. At independence, the 
imperative was to secure access to these revenues, but they soon dwindled as copper prices fell.  
Botswana experienced uninterrupted per capita growth, and although it was associated 
with high income inequality, development was manifested in particular with the advances made 
in education. Botswana is also the best candidate to exemplify stable democratic rule in Africa. 
The availability of economic rents was central to this peace and stability. Botswana‘s ‗good 
governance‘ that these rents were not squandered (although the favourable contract signed with 
De Beers gave them little opportunity or benefit in doing so). Public investments were 
increasingly made in the 1980s and 1990s, but Botswana‘s economy remains diamond dependent 
and has not diversified. 
Easterlin characterizes ‗modern economic growth‘ as an increase in living standards and 
a process that has upset the balance of political power.
94
 African recurring growth has not led to 
the same levels of living standards as are currently enjoyed elsewhere, nevertheless the growth 
episodes reviewed here have been associated with large gains being made in living standards. 
The studies of Dahomey, Gold Coast, Northern Rhodesia and Botswana also demonstrate that 
these economic growth episodes have spurred political and institutional change. It would be a 
mistake to interpret African economic history as if modern economic growth had not touched the 
African continent.  
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III 
What can we generalize from African growth episodes between 1950 and today? 
Different methods have been used to identify and define periods of sustained growth or growth 
accelerations.
95
 In this exercise growth is classified as ‗sustained‘ if the 9 year moving averages 
of GDP per capita growth are 3 percent or higher, which is a quite strict criterion, comparatively. 
The average annual GDP per capita growth in the world according to the same dataset over the 
same period was 2 percent.
96
 
Figure 3: Number of African Countries Experiencing Sustained Growth 1950–2006 
 
Source: Maddison (2009). To some extent the findings here can be conditioned by the use of the Maddison dataset 
as compared to using World Development Indicators or Penn World Tables. Ideally, one should have used the 
primary source—the official national account files—but as of yet those are not collected. A study of the quality of 
the post-colonial growth evidence found that most of the errors in the data are eliminated if one averages growth 
over periods longer than 5 years, and that there were fewer erroneous growth fluctuations in the Maddison dataset as 
compared to the Penn World Tables and the World Development Indicators.
97
 The full list of countries and the 
observations of sustained growth by country is given in the appendix, Of course, when 9 year moving averages are 
calculated, the data set only covers 1955 to 2002.  
 
The interpretation of Figure 3 is straightforward. Many countries experienced high 
growth towards the end of the colonial period. When most African economies regained their 
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independence the prevalence of sustained growth in Africa increased. In 1967–1968 half of 
Africa‘s economies were in the middle of a decade of sustained rapid growth. This trend of more 
countries joining a path of growth was reversed in the beginning of the 1970s, and following the 
second oil shock, 1979–1981, there was only a handful of countries that achieved sustained 
growth in the 1980s. The improvement was slight until very recently. A quarter of African 
economies have been experiencing sustained growth since 1998.  
Between 1985 and 1989 among the few countries that experienced sustained growth were 
Mauritius and Botswana, which are widely recognized as the African growth miracles. Less 
recognized in the literature are Cape Verde, Equatorial Guinea, Lesotho and the Seychelles, but 
given their past growth and current relative position in terms of GDP per capita, they do deserve 
the same kind of attention given to the Mauritius and Botswana ‗miracles‘.98 Liberia and Chad 
also experienced a 4 year period of sustained growth in the late 1980s.  
Figure 4: Number of African Countries Experiencing Sustained Growth Failure 
 
The phenomenon of failed growth has received far more attention in the economic 
literature on African development. Here sustained growth failure is defined as occurring when 
the 9 year moving average of real GDP per capita growth is less than zero percent, that is an 
overall and lasting deterioration in income per capita. Figure 4 shows the occurrence of growth 
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failure in Africa each year between 1955 and 2002. Until the 1980s a sustained growth failure 
was the exception in Africa. Between the 1950 and 1960s only Benin, Tanzania and Morocco 
experienced sustained periods of stagnation and negative growth. In the 1960s also Chad and the 
Central African Republic were stagnating, and this group of ill performers (Tanzania and 
Morocco improved on their performance) was joined by Senegal, Niger and Somalia in the late 
1960s and the early 1970s. A sudden spike in the list of ill performers occurred in the late 1970s. 
Thereafter, in the 1980s and early 1990s the failure of growth became the rule rather than the 
exception. 
Figure 5: Growing, Failing and Preserving African Economies, 1950–2006 
 
 
 
Figure 5 fills in the missing part of the picture painted in the previous figures. While 
some economies were growing and others were failing, a number of economies were growing in 
a modest fashion, making progress albeit slowly. This also brings evidence to support that 
economic growth and development was widespread in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, and growth 
failure the exception. It further suggests that growth following Structural Adjustment was the 
exception rather than the rule. Finally, it is evident that the recent African growth episode has 
been less widely shared than the boom in the earlier period.  
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IV 
The global economic downturn in the 1980s hit Africa harder than other continents. A 
combination of the depressed demand in external markets and elites turning to predatory rent 
seeking made sure that growth did fail in the majority of African economies between 1975 and 
1995, when growth failure became more normal than sustained growth. It is now widely 
recognized that the economic downturn also led to political disorder and state failure.
99
 The 
economic literature on civil war and conflict has recognized that both low income and economic 
shocks are correlated—and therefore possible causing, or at least increasing the probability of, 
civil war and conflict.
100
  
Does the most recent downturn suggest a similar failure? There is reason to hope that the 
current economic crisis might be less deep and prolonged because the majority of African states 
are now pursuing orthodox market policies. There are fewer opportunities for predatory rent 
seeking. It is not yet clear whether African economies will be in position to soften the downturn 
for large parts of the population. The period of economic contraction in the 1980s was met by 
fiscal austerity as prescribed in structural adjustment policy programmes. In strict contradiction 
with previous austerity reforms IMF recently suggested the use of counter-cyclical fiscal policy 
to ‗weather the storm‘ this time.101 The first thing that suffers in an externally induced economic 
crisis in export oriented economies is its fiscal capacity. A recurring theme has been the state‘s 
vulnerability to economic shocks. Rather than being counter-cyclical, fiscal policy and state 
intervention have been expanding with economic growth. To engage in fiscal expansive policy 
this time African states would have to depend on external funds. 
Vantage point is always important, and the current slowdown puts recent publications 
such as ―Africa at a Turning Point?‖ and ―Africa‘s Turn?‖ in a less favourable light.102 The 
authors of these publications suggested that Africa might be about to embark on its long awaited 
sustained growth path. Collier, writing when conditions looked rosier for African economies, 
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suggested that one source of growth was that Africa was ‗learning from mistakes‘.103 What 
lessons should be taken from the current slowdown? The most recent period of economic growth 
did not entail the large improvements in human development as was the case in 1950–1975.104 It 
has furthermore not been associated with much industrial growth. The former may indicate that 
the growth has not ‗trickled down‘ while the latter indicates that we will not see the crisis 
resulting in a deindustrialisation, though some investments in mineral extraction are now being 
recalled.
105
 It is also evident that with an adjustment to the market only economies that have 
enjoyed comparative advantage in natural resources have really experienced growth in this 
period; and growth was wider spread and on a broader economic basis in agriculture and 
manufacturing. The recent period of growth was not matched by an expansion of the state. The 
fiscal capacity of the state were not been diversified away from exports, but specialized towards 
them as most states accepted their comparative advantage in natural resource exports. 
The basis of recurring growth in African has always been strong external demand. 
Growth has not been triumphant and the end of growth periods has ended with a combination of 
predatory rent-seeking and depressed external markets. The recent boom was one-sided, based 
on external market demand for natural resources. The good news is that the boom was associated 
with orthodox macroeconomic management. Africa enters today‘s crisis with a smaller debt 
burden, and with a smaller propensity for rent seeking than in the past. The bad news is that 
African economies are as dependent on external forces as ever. Economic growth will not return 
until external demand revives. It has been suggested that fiscal policy might lighten the recession 
domestically in Africa, but the fiscal basis of African states does not allow this without recourse 
to external financing. History will be repeating itself. When the world market demand returns 
and natural resource rents are again available, growth will return. The dependency of African 
economies on export volumes and prices makes their development path one of recurring growth.  
This paper has faced a limitation that all similar efforts must face: a severe paucity of 
data on the period before 1960. We lack basic data on population, yields, and prices, both for 
consumers and for those supplying factor markets. Without such data, we cannot estimate total 
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factor productivity and thereby secure reliable measures of growth, much less insight into its 
decomposition. Such analysis is available for the post-independence period, as for instance in the 
study undertaken by Ndulu et al.
106
 It has been pointed out that this presumed availability of 
reliable macro data for the post-colonial data is often misleading.
107
 Data on the post-colonial 
period are worse than commonly thought, and conversely, we know more about the colonial and 
pre-colonial economic change than what is commonly assumed. A mix of qualitative accounts 
and careful use of the data that are available gives substance to the analysis of growth episodes in 
this paper. In terms of quantitative data, there has been a focus on factors on the demand side, 
but the analyses of the supply side are as important.  
This paper has emphasised that the search for a root cause of African underdevelopment 
is futile, and that it would be asking the wrong question. The modest task of social scientists is to 
come up with good research questions. There is a crucial difference between approaching the 
conundrum of African growth by asking why there has been a chronic growth failure and that of 
asking why African economies have grown and why they have retrogressed. There have been 
periods of rapid economic change and accumulation, which in turn caused important qualitative 
changes in how societies and economies were organised. It seems that the study of growth as a 
recurring process is central to understanding the prospects for sustained growth in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. While we do know how these periods of growth are related to world economic patterns, 
initial research on how these patterns change economic power and structure within African 
economies points to key, yet relatively understudied questions that demand answers. The growth 
episodes in this study were rooted in trade and the world economy, but this growth was only 
possible due to a reorganisation of factors of production, a combination of investment and 
technological growth that had political-economy consequences. There is therefore nothing 
inherently failed or dysfunctional about African markets, states or geography that inhibits 
economic growth. What needs further detailed study is what happens to African markets and 
states during the process of growth as well as decline. 
                                                          
106 Ndulu et al, Political Economy of Growth. 
107 Jerven, ‗Random Growth‘. 
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Appendix: Years of ‘Sustained Growth’ in African Economies since State Independence 
 
Years of ‗Sustained 
Growth‘ 
Before 
1975 
1975–
1994 
After 
1995 
Longest 
Uninterrupted 
Period 
Algeria  24 16 7 1 1966-1981 
Angola 15 10 - 5 1959-1967 
Benin  2 - 2 - 1980-1981 
Botswana 23 12 18 5 1963-1992 
Burkina Faso 7 6 1 - 1955-1958 
Burundi 10 9 1 - 1966-1974 
Cameroon  8 - 8 - 1977-1984 
Cape Verde  20 - 12 8 1977-1987 
Central African Republic  - - - - - 
Chad  7 - 4 3 1984-1987 
Comoro Islands  10 10 - - 1958-1967 
Congo 'Brazzaville' 13 5 8 - 1976-1983 
Côte d'Ivoire 9 9 - - 1959-1967 
Djibouti 1 1 - - 1969 
Egypt  21 7 10 4 1972-1984 
Equatorial Guinea  32 13 11 8 1955-1967 
Eritrea and Ethiopia  10 9 - 1 1959-1967 
Gabon 22 20 2 - 1955-1976 
Gambia  11 10 1 - 1961-1965 
Ghana 2 1 - 1 1957 
Guinea  3 3 - - 1957-1958 
Guinea Bissau  17 17 - - 1955-1971 
Kenya 5 5 - - 1966-1970 
Lesotho 29 15 12 2 1969-1980 
Liberia 7 3 4 - 1990-1993 
Libya  15 15 - - 1955-1969 
Madagascar - - - - - 
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Years of ‗Sustained 
Growth‘ 
Before 
1975 
1975–
1994 
After 
1995 
Longest 
Uninterrupted 
Period 
Malawi 10 8 2 - 1967-1976 
Mali 10 1 3 6 1997-2002 
Mauritania  15 14  1 1955-1968 
Mauritius  35 10 17 8 1983-2002 
Morocco  13 5 6 2 1970-1980 
Mozambique 12 6 - 6 1997-2002 
Namibia  9 9 - - 1958-1966 
Niger 5 5 - - 1958-1962 
Nigeria 9 9 - - 1966-1974 
Rwanda 16 6 6 4 1969-1974 
São Tomé and Principe  11 11 - - 1958-1968 
Senegal  - - - - - 
Seychelles 20 7 12 1 1986-1995 
Sierra Leone 6 5 - 1 1965-1967 
Somalia  2 2 - - 1973-1974 
South Africa  4 4 - - 1963-1967 
Sudan  11 2 1 8 1995-2002 
Swaziland 20 20 - - 1956-1974 
Tanzania  2 1  1 1966 
Togo 10 10 - - 1960-1969 
Tunisia  32 16 8 8 1959-1980 
Uganda  11 2 3 6 1992-2000 
Zaire (Congo Kinshasa) 1 1 - - 1955 
Zambia  8 8 - - 1960-1963 
Zimbabwe 11 11 - - 1966-1973 
 
Source: Maddison 2009. 
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